Publications in Philosophy

Philosophy

Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles

Meincke, A. S.: "The Metaphysics of Development and Evolution: From Thing Ontology to Process Ontology". Human Development 67, 5-6 (2023), 233-256.

Meincke, A. S.: "The Metaphysics of Living Consciousness: Metabolism, Agency and Purposiveness" (Comment), Biosemiotics 16, 1 (2023), DOI: 10.1007/s12304-023-09531-0.

Meincke, A. S.: "'Hervorbringende Organe', 'Bildende Kraft'? Heideggers Gegenentwurf zu Kants Theorie des Organismus" ("'Productive Organs', 'Formative Power'? Heidegger's Antithesis to Kant's Theory of Organism"), Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 71, 1 (2023), 52-80.

Meincke, A. S.: "One or Two? A Process View of Pregnancy", Philosophical Studies 179 (2022), 1495-1521 (published online on 15 September 2021), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01716-y.

Meincke, A. S.: “The Disappearance of Change. Towards a Process Account of Persistence”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27, 1 (2019), 12-30, published online on 5 December 2018, https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2018.1548634.

Meincke, A. S.: “Autopoiesis, Biological Autonomy and the Process View of Life”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9:5 (2019), published online on 26 October 2018, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-018-0228-2 (Topical Collection: EPSA 2017: Selected papers from the biannual conference in Exeter).

Meincke, A. S.: “Personale Identität ohne Persönlichkeit? Anmerkungen zu einem vernachlässigten Zusammenhang” (“Personal Identity Without Personality? Reflections on a Neglected Relation”). Philosophisches Jahrbuch 123, 1 (2016), 114-145.

Meincke, A. S.: “Potentialität und Disposition in der Diskussion über den Status des menschlichen Embryos: Zur Ontologie des Potentialitätsarguments” (“Potentiality and Disposition in the Debate on the Status of the Human Embryo: On the Ontology of the Argument from Potentiality”), Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 122, 2 (2015), 271-303.

Spann (née Meincke), A. S.: “Endlichkeit ohne Unendlichkeit? Anmerkungen zu Heideggers Wegkreuzung mit Hegel im Seinsproblem” (“Finitude without Infinity? Remarks on Heidegger’s Crossing with Hegel in the Problem of Being”), Philosophisches Jahrbuch 119, 2 (2012), 283-316.

Meincke, A. S.: “Körper oder Organismus? Eric T. Olsons Cartesianismusvorwurf gegen das Körperkriterium transtemporaler personaler Identität” (“Body or Organism? Eric T. Olson’s Charge of Cartesianism Against the Bodily Criterion of Transtemporal Personal Identity”). Philosophisches Jahrbuch 117, 1 (2010), 88-120.

Invited Journal Articles

Meincke, A. S.: “Systems or Bodies? On How (Not) to Embody Autopoiesis”, Commentary on Villalobos, M. & Razeto-Barry, P. (2019): “Are living beings extended autopoietic systems? An embodied reply”, Adaptive Behaviour 2019, published online on 8 April 2019, https://doi.org/10.1177/1059712319841301.

Spann (née Meincke), A. S.: “Dualität im Horizont des Physischen. Thomas Buchheims ‘horizontaler Dualismus’ als Antwort auf das Problem mentaler Verursachung” (“Duality in the Horizon of the Physical. Thomas Buchheim’s ‘Horizontal Dualism’ as Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation”), Philosophisches Jahrbuch 120, 1 (2013), 142-151.

Reprinted in: Mentale Verursachung (Mental Causation), ed. by Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, (Jahrbuch-Kontroversen 1), Freiburg: Alber, 2014.

Monograph

Meincke, A. S. Auf dem Kampfplatz der Metaphysik. Kritische Studien zur transtemporalen Identität von Personen. (On the Battlefield of Metaphysics. Critical Studies on the Transtemporal Identity of Persons). Münster: Mentis Publishing Company, 2015 (333 pp.).

Reviewed in:

Philosophisches Jahrbuch 123, 2 (2016), 602-604.

Abstract:

In this monograph, I systematically analyse the debate on personal identity in recent analytic metaphysics, including recent biologically inspired (so-called animalist) theories of personal identity. I argue that the debate is stuck in a dilemma: personal identity - a person's persistence through time - either is eliminated in the process of being reduced to relations of empirical continuity, or it is turned into some mysterious primitive further fact supposedly adding to the empirical facts. I further argue that this dilemma is neither harmless nor new: the modern antagonism between the reductionist elimination of personal identity on the one hand and its non-reductionist mystification on the other rather repeats the antagonism between rationalist dogmatism and empirical scepticism in the 18th century’s debates on the soul. This latter antagonism has been extensively examined by Kant who also sought for ways to overcome the dilemma. The systematic analysis of the modern analytic debate on personal identity is therefore followed by a presentation and critical discussion of the constructive approaches taken by Kant and post-Kantian ‘continental’ philosophers. From a Kantian perspective, it appears that when thinking about personal identity we are confronted with a fundamental dialectic that originates in the very structure of human reason and threatens to turn metaphysics altogether into an arena of fruitless battles. The possibility of a satisfactory metaphysical account of transtemporal personal identity reveals itself to be contingent on the possibility of a ‘good’ metaphysics able to overcome that dialectic.

Edited Volumes

Meincke, A. S. & Dupré, J. (Ed.): Biological Identity. Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Biology, (History and Philosophy of Biology), London: Routledge, 2020 (with contributions by John Dupré, Adam Ferner, Philippe Huneman, Elselijn Kingma, Anne Sophie Meincke, Alvaro Moreno, Matteo Mossio, Stuart Newman, David Oderberg, Eric T. Olson, Paul F. Snowdon, Denis Walsh, Kayla Wiebe, David Wiggins).

Online access via Tylor & Francis eBooks:

https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781351066389

Abstract:

Analytic metaphysics has recently discovered biology as a means of grounding metaphysical theories. This has resulted in long-standing metaphysical puzzles, such as the problems of personal identity and material constitution, being increasingly addressed by appeal to a biological understanding of identity. This development within metaphysics is in significant tension with the growing tendency amongst philosophers of biology to regard biological identity as a deep puzzle in its own right, especially following recent advances in our understanding of symbiosis, the evolution of multi-cellular organisms and the inherently dynamical character of living systems. Moreover, and building on these biological insights, the broadly substance ontological framework of metaphysical theories of biological identity appears problematic to a growing number of philosophers of biology who invoke process ontology instead.
This volume addresses this tension, exploring to what extent it can be dissolved. For this purpose, the volume presents the first selection of essays exclusively focused on biological identity and written by experts in metaphysics, the philosophy of biology and biology. The resulting cross-disciplinary dialogue paves the way for a convincing account of biological identity that is both metaphysically constructive and scientifically informed, and will be of interest to metaphysicians, philosophers of biology and theoretical biologists.

Meincke, A. S. (Ed.): Dispositionalism. Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, (Synthese Library 417), Cham: Springer, 2020 (with contributions by Rani L. Anjum, Alexander Bird, Steven French, Ruth Groff, John Heil, Maximilian Kistler, Anna Marmodoro, Anne Sophie Meincke, Stephen Mumford, Elina Pechlivanidi, Stathis Psillos, Josef Quitterer, Matthew Tugby, Neil E. Williams; xii + 247pp.).

Online access via Springer Link:

https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-28722-1

Abstract:

According to dispositional realism, or dispositionalism, the entities inhabiting our world possess irreducibly dispositional properties – often called ‘powers’ – by means of which they are sources of change. Dispositionalism has become increasingly popular among metaphysicians in the last three decades as it offers a realist account of causation and provides novel avenues for understanding modality, laws of nature, agency, free will and other key concepts in metaphysics. At the same time, it is receiving growing interest among philosophers of science. This reflects the substantial role scientific findings play in arguments for dispositionalism which, as a metaphysics of science, aims to unveil the very foundations of science.

The present collection of essays brings together both strands of interest. It elucidates the ontological profile of dispositionalism by exploring its ontological commitments, and it discusses these from the perspective of the philosophy of science. The essays are written by both proponents of dispositionalism and sceptics so as to initiate an open-minded, constructive dialogue.

Vermögen_und_Handlung_Cover_(Mentis).jpg

Spann (née Meincke), A. S. & Wehinger, D. (Ed.): Vermögen und Handlung. Der dispositionale Realismus und unser Selbstverständnis als Handelnde (Power and Action. Dispositional Realism and Our Self-Understanding as Agents), Münster: Mentis, 2014 (with contributions by Thomas Buchheim, Michael Esfeld, Georg Gasser, Eva-Maria Jung, Christian Kanzian, Geert Keil, Erasmus Mayr, Uwe Meixner, Edmund Runggaldier, Stephan Schmid, Markus Schrenk, Anne Sophie Spann (née Meincke), Barbara Vetter; 335 pp.).

Reviewed in:

Philosophisches Jahrbuch 123, 1 (2016), 299-301.

Abstract:

An important motivation for the assumption of irreducible powers and dispositions in the context of contemporary dispositionalism is our self-understanding as agents. We experience ourselves as agents who actively influence the course of things. We attribute causal powers to ourselves when acting and likewise to the things surrounding us.
What exactly does the relationship between power and agency consist in? How does a realist view of powers and dispositions relate to the opposition between agent causal and event causal theories of action causation? How do the causal powers of living beings differ from the causal powers of inanimate nature? How are we to explicate the difference between active and passive powers which seems relevant to our understanding of agency? Can a metaphysics of causal powers help explain in what sense we are free when acting?
This volume offers answers to these questions which attract increasing philosophical attention within current debates on powers and dispositions. The volume explores the far-reaching spectrum of implications of dispositional realism as a metaphysical position for our understanding of causation, agency and free will. It is of interest to all who are eager to learn more about the relation between power and agency.

Peer-Reviewed Book Chapters

Meincke, A. S.: "Continuant Processes or Processual Continuants? Towards an Analytic Process Metaphysics", in: Objects and Properties: New Essays in Metaphysics, ed. by A. Moran & C. Rossi, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

Meincke, A. S.: “Heidegger’s Process Metaphysics of Personhood”, in: Ethics and Time in the Philosophy of History: A Cross-Cultural Approach, ed. B. Gilbert & N. Elgabsi, London: Bloomsbury, 2023, 173-192.

Meincke, A. S.: “Processual Animalism: Towards a Scientifically Informed Theory of Personal Identity”, in: Biological Identity. Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Biology, (History and Philosophy of Biology), ed. by A. S. Meincke & J. Dupré, London: Routledge, 2020, 251-278, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781351066389/chapters/10.4324/9781351066389-14.

Meincke, A.S. & Dupré, J.: "Biological Identity: Why Metaphysicians and Philosophers of Biology Should Talk to One Another", in: Biological Identity. Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Biology, (History and Philosophy of Biology), ed. by A. S. Meincke & J. Dupré, London: Routledge, 2020, 1-21, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781351066389/chapters/10.4324/
9781351066389-1.

Meincke, A. S.: “Powers, Persistence and Process”, in: Dispositionalism. Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, ed. by A. S. Meincke, Cham: Springer, 2020, 89-113, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-28722-1_7.

Meincke, A. S.: “Dispositionalism: Between Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science”, in: Dispositionalism. Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, ed. by A. S. Meincke, Cham: Springer, 2020, 1-12, https://link.springer.com/chapter/
10.1007/978-3-030-28722-1_1.

Meincke, A. S.: “Persons as Biological Processes. A Bio-Processual Way Out of the Personal Identity Dilemma”, in: Everything Flows. Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology, ed. by D. J. Nicholson & J. A. Dupré, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 357-378.

Meincke, A. S.: “Bio-Agency and the Possibility of Artificial Agents”, in: Philosophy of Science - Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities. Selected Papers from the 2016 conference of the German Society of Philosophy of Science, ed. by A. Christian et al. Dordrecht: Springer (European Studies in Philosophy of Science 9), 2018, 65-93.

Other Book Chapters

Meincke, A. S.: "Emergent Properties", in: The Routledge Handbook Properties, ed. by Maurin, A.-S. & Fisher, A., London: Routledge, 2024, 347-357.

Meincke, A. S.: “Bergson and Process Philosophy of Biology”, in: The Bergsonian Mind, ed. Y. Wolf & M. Sinclair, London: Routledge, 2021, 432-445.

Meincke, A. S.: "Biological Subjectivity. Processual Animalism as a Unified Account of Personal Identity", in: The Unity of a Person: Philosophical Perspectives, ed. by J. Noller, London: Routledge, 2021, 100-126.

Meincke, A. S.: “Human Persons – A Process View”, in: Was sind und wie existieren Personen? Probleme und Perspektiven der gegenwärtigen Forschung (What Are Persons and How Do They Exist? Problems and Perspectives of Contemporary Research), ed. by J. Noller, Münster: Mentis, 2019, 57-80.

Meincke, A. S.: “Haben menschliche Embryonen eine Disposition zur Personalität?” (“Do Human Embryos Have a Disposition to Personhood?”), in: Der manipulierbare Embryo, ed. by M. Hähnel, M. Rothhaar & R. Kipke, Münster: Mentis, 2017, 147-171.

Meincke, A. S.: “Von der Wirklichkeit des Wirklichen. Eine kritische Verteidigung der Metaphysik als philosophischer Disziplin” (“On the Reality of the Real: A Critical Defence of Metaphysics as a Philosophical Discipline”), in: Wozu Metaphysik? Historisch-systematische Perspektiven (Why Metaphysics? Historical and Systematic Perspectives), ed. by C. Erhard, D. Meißner & J. Noller, Freiburg i. Br.: Alber, 2017, 96-130.

Spann (née Meincke), A. S.: “Bio-agency: Können Organismen handeln?” (“Bio-Agency: Can Organisms Act?”), in: Vermögen und Handlung. Der dispositionale Realismus und unser Selbstverständnis als Handelnde (Power and Action. Dispositional Realism and Our Self-Understanding as Agents), ed. by A. S. Spann (née Meincke) & D. Wehinger, Münster: Mentis, 2014, 191-224.

Spann (née Meincke), A. S. & Wehinger, D.: “Einleitung” (“Introduction”), in: Vermögen und Handlung. Der dispositionale Realismus und unser Selbstverständnis als Handelnde (Power and Action. Dispositional Realism and Our Self-Understanding as Agents), ed. by A. S. Spann (née Meincke) & D. Wehinger, Münster: Mentis, 2014, 11-19.

Spann (née Meincke), A. S.: “Persönlichkeit und personale Identität. Zur Fragwürdigkeit eines substanztheoretischen Vorurteils” (“Personality and Personal Identity. On a Dubious Substance Ontological Prejudice”), in: Persönlichkeit. Neurowissenschaftliche und neurophilosophische Fragestellungen (Personality. Questions in Neuroscience and Neurophilosophy, ed. by O. Friedrich & M. Zichy, Münster: Mentis, 2014, 163-187.

Spann (née Meincke), A. S.: “Ohne Metaphysik, bitte!? Transtemporale personale Identität als praktische Wirklichkeit” (“Without Metaphysics?! Transtemporal Personal Identity as Practical Reality“), in: Personale Identität, Narrativität und praktische Rationalität (Personal Identity, Narritivity and Practical Rationality), ed. by G. Gasser & M. Schmidhuber, Münster: Mentis, 2013, 241-265.

Spann (née Meincke), A. S.: “Substanz, Relation oder beides: Augustinus und Heidegger zur Frage ‘Was sind Personen?’” (“Substance, Relation or Both: Augustine and Heidegger on the Question ‘What are Persons?’”), in: Crossing Borders. Grenzen (über)denken. Beiträge zum 9. Internationalen Kongress der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Wien, ed. by A. Dunshirn, E. Nemeth & G. Unterthurner, 2012, 839-847, https://phaidra.univie.ac.at/detail_object/o:128384.

Online Publication

Spann (née Meincke), A. S.: “Zwischen Selbigkeit und Veränderung: Personen und ihre transtemporale Identität” (“Between Sameness and Change: Persons and their Transtemporal Identity”), Talk at the 22th German Congress for Philosophy, September 11-15, 2011, Ludwig Maximilian University Munich, Open Access LMU (2012), http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12565/.

German Literature

Book Reviews

Meincke, A. S.: Review of: Chauncey Maher: Plant Minds, London: Routledge, 2017, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science: Review of Books, 2019, http://www.thebsps.org/2019/02/chaunceymahers-plantminds-meincke/.

Meincke, A. S.: Review of: Derek M. Jones: The Biological Foundations of Action, (History and Philosophy of Biology), London: Routledge, 2017, in: History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 40 (2018): 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-018-0198-x.

Spann (née Meincke), A. S.: Review of: Cordula Brand: Personale Identität oder menschliche Persistenz? Ein naturalistisches Kriterium, Paderborn: Mentis, 2010, Philosophisches Jahrbuch 119, 2 (2012), 418-424.

Meincke, A. S.: Review of: Michael Quante: Person, (Grundthemen Philosophie), Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2007, Philosophisches Jahrbuch 116, 1 (2009), 221-225.

Publications in German Literature

Monograph

Meincke, A. S.: Finalität und Erzählstruktur. Gefährdet Didos Liebe zu Eneas die narrative Kohärenz der ‘Eneide’ Heinrichs von Veldeke? (Finality and Narrative Structure. Does Dido’s Love for Eneas Threaten the Narrative Coherence of Heinrich von Veldeke’s ‘Eneide’?), Stuttgart: ibidem, 2007 (282 pp.).

Reviewed in:

Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur 138, 3 (2009), 397-399.
Arbitrium. Zeitschrift für Rezensionen zur germanistischen Literaturwissenschaft 28, 1 (2010), 38-39.
IASLonline, 7th August 2013.

Journal Article

Poetry

Meincke, A. S.: “Narrative Selbstreflexion als poetologischer Diskurs. Fiktionalitätsbewußtsein im ‘Reinfried von Braunschweig’?” (“Narrative Self-Reflection as Poetological Discourse. Awareness of Fictionality in the ‘Reinfried von Braunschweig’?”), Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur 136,3 (2007), 312-351.

Poetry

Wider Public

Thora Engel (A. S. Meincke): "lockdown", in: Die Corona-Anthologie (by Cognac & Biskotten), ed. by T. Schafferer, Innsbruck: pyjamaguerillos Verlag, 2021, p. 262.

Thora Engel (A. S. Meincke): "samen", in: Saatkorn sein. Zwischen Mühlsteinen, ed. by A. Armélin and U. Grasnick, Berlin: Quintus Verlag, 2020, p. 41f..

Thora Engel (A. S. Meincke): “mikrologie des seins” (“micrology of being”), in: Science meets Fiction. Nanomodellierungen: Poesie und Mikroskopie, ed. by A. Heydenreich and K. Mecke, 2018, Erlangen: homunculus verlag, 14-15 (before being published in print, the poem was displayed at the arts exhibition “EAM Science meets Fiction”, organised by the Excellence Cluster Engineering of Advanced Materials [EAM], 16th September - 27th October 2017, Erlangen, Germany).

View www.philolyrik.blogspot.com

Philosophical Writings for the Wider Public

Meincke, A. S.: "Free by Nature: The Biological Roots of Free Will", Rudolphina (Research Magazine of the University of Vienna), 29th November 2023.

Meincke, A. S. & Woebken, D.: "Was ist Leben?" ("What is Life?"), Der Standard, Austrian newspaper, Junge Akademie Blog, 25th October 2023.

Meincke, A. S./Láng, Oliver: "Der Witz als Knobelaufgabe. Die Philosophin Anne Sophie Meincke über das Phänomen Humor", Programme booklet of the Vienna State Opera "Rossini Mania 2022" for the guest performance of the Opéra de Monte-Carlo mit Cecilia Bartoli, June 2022, pp. 116-120.

Meincke, A. S.: "Haben wir die Wahl beim Wollen?" ("Do We Have a Choice in Wanting?"), Interview, Rudolphina (Research Magazine of the University of Vienna), 3rd June 2022.

Meincke, A. S.: "Können Tiere denken?" ("Can Animals Think?"), ca. 1,800 words, Der Standard, Austrian newspaper, Junge Akademie Blog, 18th May 2022 (305 postings).

Meincke, A. S.: "Was ich noch sagen wollte" ("What I Still Wanted to Say"), Interview, PhilPublica, 10th March 2022.

Meincke, A. S./Senarclens De Grancy, A.: "Und es gibt ihn doch: Der freie Wille als Teil des Lebendigen", Report on my research project "Bio-Agency and Natural Freedom" in the Austrian newspaper Die Presse, 5th March 2022.

Publications in Philosophy

Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles

Invited Journal Articles

Other Journal Article

Monograph

Edited Volumes

Peer-Reviewed Book Chapters

Other Book Chapters

Online Publication

Book Reviews

Publications in German Literature

Monograph

Journal Article

Poetry

Philosophical Writings for the Wider Public